Representation by J Chanay
- Date submitted
- 30 September 2020
- Submitted by
- Members of the public/businesses
EN010012 Relevant Representation: Sizewell C New Nuclear Power Station DCO Application CONTENTS 1. Representation resource capacity: gross asymmetry 2. Radioactive waste 2.1 APP-192 para.7.7.20: Low Level Radioactive Waste Facility 2.2 APP-183 Figure 2.2: Proposed on-site Spent Fuel Storage Facility (Building 44) and Intermediate Level Waste Storage Facility (Building 45) 2.3 No defensible justification on avoidable preference for SZC, a radioactive waste producing DCO Project 3. Need justification questionable 3.1 APP-062: Statement of Reasons 3.2 APP-590 & APP-591: 8.4 Planning Statement & Appendix 8.4A Site Selection Report 4. APP-066: Funding Statement: insufficient information 5. APP-344: Major Accidents and Disasters 1. Representation resource capacity: gross asymmetry 1.1 As lay Interested Party, lacking necessary resource capacity to commission expert appraisal of the SZC DCO Application, any representation is bound to fall short of adequacy. 2. Radioactive waste 2.1 APP-192 para.7.7.20: Low Level Radioactive Waste Facility What is the plan for LLW in the event of backlog accumulation resulting from delay in availability of new disposal facilities? What annual radioactivity inventory might that be? 2.2 APP-183 Figure 2.2: Proposed on-site Spent Fuel Storage Facility (Building 44) and Intermediate Level Waste Storage Facility (Building 45) 2.2.1. Lack of information on annual and cumulative lifespan radioactivity inventory in each Facility: APP-192 para.7.7.73. 2.2.2. Lack of information on what entity is guaranteed to be around to decommission these on-site Facilities after 120 years: APP-192 paras 7.7.89 and 7.7.92. 2.2.3. Neither Facility is designated an NSIP under section 14 of the PA2008. The following reasonably warrant deletion from Schedule 1, Work No. 1A of the dDCO (APP-059) and from any Grant of DCO by the Decision Maker: (f) intermediate level waste store, including structures and plant; (g) interim spent fuel store, including associated structures and plant; and, (h) (xxx) interim spent fuel store equipment storage building. 2.2.4. In planning terms, on what basis are these three facilities not properly classed as standalone non-NSIP developments in their own right, subject by default to land use planning consents determination under the TCPA 1990? It would be inappropriate to deem these facilities as permitted development under any Grant of SZC DCO. 2.2.5. It could not be acceptable for the Applicant to include these buildings in the SZC DCO Application while withholding information on design details, elevation and construction commencement (relative to commissioning the first reactor), until after winning a Grant of DCO for SZC: APP-590 para.4.8.4, as well as a vague para.7.7.68 in APP-192. 2.2.6 Furthermore, the Applicant seeks to avoid direct obligation (and, legitimate expectation) under APP-192 para.7.7.93. The Applicant inexplicably expects taxpayers (or, some other unnamed entity) to establish and provide a centralised spent fuel interim storage facility, as alternative to on-site interim storage. This is surely, as it properly ought to be, the responsibility of radioactive waste producer(s). 2.3 No defensible justification on avoidable preference for SZC, a radioactive waste producing DCO Project 2.3.1 Misleading and inadequate Section 56 Public Notice published in national newspapers (for example, The Times on 8 July 2020). Under the “main aspects of the Project”, the Applicant inexplicably failed to inform the wider public of on-site storage of highly radioactive waste. It is a particularly egregious omission given, a. that on-site storage has a proposed lifespan of twice (if not three times) the life span of the SZC nuclear generating station itself; and, b. the continuing and proposed accumulation of highly radioactive waste is proving to be a most intractable and significant long term waste problem in the UK. After nearly 80 years of waste production and accumulation, there exists no proven environmentally sound permanent disposal solution for highly radioactive waste. Verified reliable technology, materials and solution (GDF) evidently does not yet exist in the UK. 2.3.2 Ensured safe containment integrity of nuclear waste burial over 250,000 years into a distant future remains unproven. Nine years on from the 2011 conclusions in nuclear NPS EN-6 at para.2.11.1 and section B5, respectively, there’s not even an indication of availability of a suitable GDF site anywhere in the UK. Moreover, proof of evidence on ensured technical achievement is not in sight either, failing the 1976 RCEP Recommendation 27 test: “demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt”. In the absence of proven up to date evidence from the UK Government on a UK operating GDF, in respect of EN-6 para.2.11.4, the ExA could not reasonably disregard materially significant implication of: a. Recommendation 27 of the 1976 Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP); and, b. a salient fact noted by the former Chief Inspector (HM Inspectorate of Pollution) Dr Allan Duncan, in a Letter to the Editor of The Times newspaper, published on 19 September 2020. There’s false equivalence afoot between low carbon nuclear electricity generation and other low carbon modes of electricity generation. None of the latter create, produce or generate a 250,000-year legacy burden of highly radiotoxic nuclear waste for future generations. 2.3.3 Regarding APP-590 para.7.3.87, EN-6 para 2.11.4 ought not necessarily constitute an insurmountable absolute bar on the ExA for all time, regardless of circumstances, for the purpose of taking into account and considering such material matters as identified in the Royal Commission’s Recommendation and in Dr Allan Duncan’s Letter. Moreover, the persisting manifest deficiency on ensured safe permanent disposal of radioactive waste from the proposed SZC DCO project could be said to negate the entirety of para.11.1.20 in APP-590. Not the least, considering the daunting requirement on ensuring safe bio/geo-chemical and geophysical isolation of buried nuclear waste radioisotopes and actinides from geological, surface and sub-surface biospheres for prolonged periods up to 250,000 years. 2.3.4 In all respects, the SZC DCO Application comprises rank failure to evidence low-carbon alternatives for equivalent electricity generation capacity that do not inflate the radioactive waste legacies. 3. Need justification questionable 3.1 APP-062: Statement of Reasons 3.1.1 The Applicant claims need for SZC is a done deal (paras 7.5.3-7.5.11, inclusive), by virtue of the 2011 NPSs EN-1 and EN-6, while accepting unreservedly “it is no longer possible for deployment to take place by the end of 2025” (para.7.5.4). a. Could EN-6 be construed as justifying established need for new nuclear beyond 2025? Arguably not. Presumption on need was limited to DCO proposals deployable by the end of 2025. That presumption could not be relevant consideration in the determination of SZC DCO Application. Strategic assessments of need, impact and alternatives beyond 2025 simply do not exist: section 6(7) of the PA2008, referring. APP-590 para.3.9.4 would appear misconceived. b. The 2011 nuclear NPS did not set out level of urgent need beyond 2025. EN-6 anchored “urgent” need for new nuclear to a 2011-2025 timeframe. Deployment beyond 2025 could not reasonably continue to be regarded as meeting defined urgent need beyond 2025. 3.1.2 Reliance on a 2017 Ministerial Statement (para.7.5.5), and on a consultation on a proposed new nuclear NPS (para.7.5.6), would not appear material. Neither document complies fully with requirements of section 6(7) of the PA2008. 3.1.3 Lack of evidence in APP-062 proving no realistic prospect of alternative modes of electricity generation being able to produce a comparable amount of low carbon electricity on a comparable timescale (para.7.5.9). 3.2 APP-590 & APP-591: 8.4 Planning Statement & Appendix 8.4A Site Selection Report 3.2.1 APP-591 para.1.2.10: see section 3.1, above. 3.2.2 APP-591 para.1.2.11 studiously ignores “relevant change of circumstances” spelt out in the Ministerial Statement to Parliament on 17 January 2019. Particularly, in respect of the economics of the energy market subsequent to adoption of the EN-6 NPS in 2011. 3.2.3 APP-591 paras 1.2.15-19: until Parliamentary requirements under section 6(7) of the PA2008 are fully satisfied, the Sizewell site reverts to the status of nominated site for deployment of nuclear new build between 2026 and 2035. The Applicant accepts in APP-590 para.3.9.2 that “NPS EN-1 and EN-6 do not formally have effect to the Sizewell C DCO application”. a. To that extent, the Applicant could not therefore seek to take advantage of the 2011 NPS EN-6 under APP-650 paras 7.3.28-35, inclusive, and paras 11.1.1-8, inclusive, respectively. b. It is not clear whether the Applicant has established in full requisite assessment evidence necessary for appropriate site designation, in order for the proposed DCO nuclear power station to be considered properly by the ExA for the site in question. Sections 3.8 and 3.9 in APP-590 would not appear sufficient. 4. APP-066: Funding Statement: insufficient information 4.1 Neither the ExA nor the Decision Maker could reasonably take APP-590 para.7.3.10 at face value. a. Subsidy free financial viability of new nuclear continues to remain persistently elusive for a mature technology, despite absorbing eye wateringly vast public development and deployment expenditure over the past 80 years. Nuclear continues to prove toxic for private sector investors. It is characterised by exceptionally high construction costs. And, it demands excessively high electricity generation “strike price”, in comparison with the wholesale electricity market price and the generation costs of equivalent renewable energy electricity generation capacity. b. There exists rank uncertainty on prospect of raising requisite balance of funds in the world’s financial and investment markets. At the very least, the ExA might respectfully require the Applicant to provide detailed independent assessment of impact of the global COVID-19 pandemic on financial and investment markets, including market turmoil and volatility over the next ten years (a likely timeframe for final investment decision on SZC). 4.2 Lack of information on projected generation cost per kWh. Generation cost informs the basis of “strike price” negotiations for grid supply contracts. If the strike price is in excess of the wholesale market price, consumers face correspondingly higher bills for SZC nuclear electricity than for renewable energy electricity. The ExA are respectfully requested to require rectification. 4.3 APP-066 para.3.1.3 provides insufficient public interest material information on CGN (a Chinese state owned parent of General Nuclear International Limited). The ExA are respectfully requested to require full disclosure on all China General Nuclear Corporation’s (and its Board members’) direct and indirect associations and links with the Government of China and organs. a. CGN would be legally entitled to a proportion of the electricity “strike price” income generated under any SZC supply contracts with the UK National Grid. This potentially commits UK electricity consumers to effectively defray/finance/fund/subsidise/replenish/off-set (directly or indirectly, whether through leakage or otherwise) the coffers of the totalitarian state that is China. This possibility could not readily be discounted. b. China has transformed over the past 80 years into a leading global economic and technological powerhouse. However, the one party state remains possessed of unquenched thirst for territorial expansion and annexations, under various claims on territories of neighbouring countries. Strikingly, the Chinese Government refuses to acknowledge and abide by a 2016 ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague (the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea), concerning certain islands in the South China Sea: [Redacted] 4.4 An unaccountable cost of the proposed SZC DCO Project lies in the continuing creation of additional accumulative legacy of highly radioactive waste. The legacy has to be dealt with by future generations. It’s an avoidable legacy, when it comes to boiling water to produce steam to turn turbo-generators to generate electricity. 5. APP-344: Major Accidents and Disasters 5.1 Lack of evidence on assessment and evaluation of adequacy of emergency preparedness arrangements and measures, from the latest full scale simulation exercise involving the Sizewell nuclear complex, incorporating both on-site and off-site extended scenarios. J Chanay 29.09.2020